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Start with a Presumption She Doesn’t 
Want to Be Dead: Fatal Flaws in 
Guardianships of Individuals with 
Intellectual Disability 
Nicole M. Arsenault† 
Introduction 
Guardianships1 are usually seen in cases involving two 
groups of people: children and the elderly.  Individuals who come 
before the courts needing a guardian due to an intellectual 
disability2 represent only a small subset of cases. Although the 
support needs of these adults are extremely diverse and are 
dictated by individual characteristics and circumstances not 
usually seen in the general population, in most jurisdictions, the 
 
 †. J.D., University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, 2011; 
B.A., University at Albany, State University of New York, 1995.  This article is 
dedicated to Debbie, whose brave battle brought the later surrenders of so many 
others into sharp relief.  The author also gratefully acknowledges the help of Aaron 
R. Parker, Esq., for helping her learn to write, Ralph C. Brashier, LL.M., for 
helping her learn to reason, and Marko Horn, Ph.D. for listening and critiquing 
those many hours while it all came together.  This is the foundation that made this 
article possible, and the author is endlessly thankful. 
 1. The term “guardianship” refers to a legally-sanctioned arrangement where 
certain decisional rights are transferred from an individual found to be 
incapacitated (i.e., a ward) to another person or entity for the care and protection of 
the ward’s person.  When rights regarding the ward’s estate are transferred, this is 
most often called a conservatorship. The terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-101 (2015) (defining a 
“guardian” as a person appointed to provide “partial or full supervision, 
protection[,] and assistance” to a person or minor, and a “conservator” as a person 
appointed to make decisions on behalf of the ward and provide “partial or full 
supervision, protection[,] and assistance.”).  This Article uses the term 
“guardianship.” 
 2. Intellectual disability is defined as a “disorder with onset during the 
developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning 
deficits in conceptual, social[,] and practical domains.”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013).  
With the passage of Rosa’s Law in 2010, the United States has advocated a more 
deferential reference to individuals affected in the manner described above as 
having an intellectual disability rather than mental retardation.  Rosa’s Law, Pub. 
L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010).  Research for this Article necessarily 
involved reference to materials published prior to 2010.  Where practical, the 
author has substituted the term “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” in 
deference to this forward progress in our collective respect for the rights and 
position in society of those persons impacted by this and similar diagnoses. 
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same laws and regulations govern the entire field.  Without 
specific guidance and oversight of guardians who care for adults 
with intellectual disability, a variety of problems arise. 
The competence of people with intellectual disability to make 
their own decisions is a tricky area.  Depending upon the advocacy 
being brought to bear, supporters and occasionally the individuals 
themselves argue for more or less recognition of the choices they 
make.  In June 2015, I was at a conference and the first two 
sessions I attended illustrated this point: the first argued for less 
decisional capacity for offenders with intellectual disability in 
capital cases and the second argued for greater self-determination 
and respect of individual decisions.  Although the principles of 
person-centeredness that pervade the supporting culture direct us 
toward a greater respect of individual choice, there is no clear line 
between the arguments for more or less recognition of capacity.  
But how does this work in cases where a health care decision with 
potentially life-altering consequences is being made? 
Beginning in 1996, I had the chance to work with a woman 
named Debbie.3  I met her while she was in remission from 
prolymphocytic leukemia, a rare and aggressive form of the 
disease.  I worked with her when the cancer returned for a second 
and final time.  Debbie was a funny lady.  She had a strong sense 
of the ridiculous and liked to laugh at everyone around her.  Her 
life was shaped, in part, by an intellectual disability.  Although no 
court ever determined that Debbie lacked the capacity to make 
decisions for herself, in reality, she needed a lot of support.  
Debbie had a family and a network of social services to guide her 
through decisions she did not fully understand.  Thus, while her 
rights were never formally transferred to someone else, Debbie 
had decision-making support similar to that of the many persons 
with intellectual disability who are under a guardianship. 
Debbie understood general concepts, but was often less clear 
on their application to her.  When Debbie first received the 
diagnosis, her sister Susan and other supporters tried to help her 
understand what she was facing.  Although she had years of 
treatment, check-ups, bone biopsies, and countless hours spent in 
a doctor’s office, it was not until the last weeks of her life that 
Debbie finally appeared to understand that she was dying.  Before 
that point, her radiation and chemotherapy treatments were 
something to be endured and laughed about.  There were also 
 
 3. Debbie’s story is used in this Article with the express written permission of 
her family. 
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some misunderstandings along the way.  Debbie had a cat of 
uncertain temperament, but unquestioned loyalty.  When Debbie’s 
family worked on planning her final services, her sister suggested 
having a cat etched on her grave marker.  Debbie became very 
upset, thinking that the plan was to bury “Kitty.”  It may have 
been the lack of understanding of death and freedom from fear 
that kept Debbie alive for so long.  She was something of a medical 
miracle, living over three years with a diagnosis that, in those 
days, was terminal within six months. 
Debbie was the first person I met with an intellectual 
disability who battled cancer.  I have met dozens more since then, 
but she is one of very few who has received the same aggressive 
level of treatment a non-disabled person would likely pursue.  
Intuitively, one might think that a person receiving decisional 
support would be more likely to be diagnosed early and supported 
to seek whatever treatment is likely to save or prolong his or her 
life.  There is a line of research that indicates this is not true, at 
least as it pertains to adults with intellectual disability.  As a 
group, these individuals are less likely than members of the 
general population to receive routine screenings, such as pap 
smears, mammograms, and colonoscopies, and are more likely to 
die of cancer.4 
This Article explores the areas where guardianship laws fail 
individuals whose capacity is impaired by intellectual disability.  
Part I reviews the history of the concept of guardianship, its 
origins in the common law of England, adoption in the United 
States, and evolution to the laws on the books today.  Part II 
summarizes the process by which guardians are appointed.  Part 
III examines the practice of guardianship, decisional standards, 
and major case law relevant to the issue.  Part IV looks at how 
persons with intellectual disability fit into guardianship law.  Part 
V turns to the unique challenges faced by people who step into the 
shoes of individuals with intellectual disability to make decisions 
on their behalf and how this can lead to tragic results, even when 
underpinned by the best of intentions.  Part VI offers suggestions 
for improving the legal and practical aspects of guardianship for 
these individuals. 
 
 4. See Nechama W. Greenwood et al., More Than Just a Mammogram: Breast 
Cancer Screening Perspectives of Relatives of Women with Intellectual Disability, 52 
INTELL. AND DEV. DISABILITIES 444, 452 (2014); Susan M. Havercamp et al., Health 
Disparities Among Adults with Developmental Disabilities, Adults with Other 
Disabilities, and Adults Not Reporting Disability in North Carolina, 119 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 418, 421 (2004). 
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I. A Brief History of Guardianship 
Like many legal doctrines, the concept of guardianship 
reached American jurisprudence via English common law.  
Guardianship springs from the doctrine of parens patriae, which 
refers to the right of the state to serve as protector for those who 
cannot care for themselves.5  This practice began when the 
English monarch assumed authority over the estates of orphaned 
infants and persons incompetent by reasons of “idiocy” or 
“lunacy.”6  One early court explained the rationale behind the 
protective role being taken up by the monarch rather than a 
family member: “It is not a profitable jurisdiction of the crown, but 
for the benefit of infants themselves, who must have some common 
parent.”7 
In spite of the stated humanitarian motive, parens patriae 
facilitated some very profitable arrangements for the king from its 
earliest days.  The crown enjoyed substantial largesse from those 
estates whose management it usurped under the role of “Father of 
the Country,” and abuses led to an eventual overhaul of the 
system in the seventeenth century.8  It took two further centuries 
of development for the doctrine to take on the beneficent patina it 
has today.9  The later-reported cases invoking parens patriae 
power involve guardianship of minors, in which responsibility 
reverted automatically to the crown when the natural guardian 
(i.e., the father) was unavailable or unfit.10 
In 1890, the doctrine of parens patriae made it across the 
ocean when the Supreme Court of the United States expressly 
endorsed it in Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. United States.11  The Court held that property seized 
from the former Church of Latter-Day Saints, which had been 
designated as a charity, would be redistributed for similar use by 
the state, rather than returned to the donors.12  The basis of this 
part of the decision rested upon parens patriae.13  The Court 
distinguished the operation of parens patriae power in the United 
 
 5. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). 
 6. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 
EMORY L. J. 195, 195–96 (1978). 
 7. Id. at 205. 
 8. Id. at 199–201. 
 9. Id. at 201–05. 
 10. Id. at 205–06. 
 11. 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890). 
 12. Id. at 58–59. 
 13. Id. 
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States from how it worked in England: in the United States, the 
legislature, rather than the monarch, takes on the protective 
role.14 
To get an idea of how pervasive parens patriae power has 
become in our society (and how much we take it for granted), one 
need only to contemplate the areas where it is commonly applied.  
As the doctrine took a foothold in the United States, parens 
patriae empowered states to oversee child welfare, even going as 
far as restricting parental control over children15 where there was 
a compelling interest for doing so.16  The power of parens patriae 
extends to individuals afflicted with serious mental illness.  With a 
demonstration of necessity and appropriate due process 
protections, states may administer antipsychotic medications to 
involuntarily committed patients suffering from mental illness, 
even when the patients refuse this treatment.17  The power is also 
used to support removal of decisional rights from the elderly in the 
management of their estates and persons.18  And it is used to 
support surrogate health care decisions for persons with 
intellectual disability, including end-of-life decisions.19 
 
 14. Id. at 58. 
 15. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (upholding a New 
York law prohibiting the sale of pornographic materials to minors, the Court 
referenced society’s interest in protecting the welfare of children as “transcendent”) 
(quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333 (N.Y. 1965)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (stating that “[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the 
whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given 
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and 
citizens[,]” as a reason for upholding a Massachusetts law proscribing work for 
children under the age of twelve). 
 16. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (holding that the 
state’s interest was “de minimis” and therefore an insufficient basis for removing 
three children from the custody of their unwed father where no evidence showed 
father to be unfit). 
 17. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 981 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(upholding a New York law allowing for involuntary commitment and medication of 
patients with mental illness where a hearing was provided and mental health 
professionals conducted regular reviews). 
 18. See Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of 
Parens Patriae, 40 MO. L. REV. 215, 231–32 (1975). 
 19. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(Mass. 1977).  In considering whether to allow removal of treatment from a 
terminally ill resident of the state school who had an intellectual disability, the 
Court opined: 
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome 
question—whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be 
withheld from a person incapable of making his own decision—as 
constituting a “gratuitous encroachment” on the domain of medical 
expertise.  Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require 
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that 
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At points in its history, a very broad view of parens patriae 
power has been sanctioned by legal scholars and the courts.20  In 
other instances, judges and justices have reached into previously-
unfettered state practice and added a healthy dose of restraint.  
An example of the Supreme Court applying its restraint in parens 
patriae can be found in In re Gault, a near-total rejection of 
Arizona’s method of ordering commitment of alleged juvenile 
delinquents to state facilities.21  In Gault, the Court reviewed the 
practice of trying juvenile offenders without affording them the 
benefit of counsel and other due process protections commonly 
afforded to adults.22  Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, 
likened the gravity of the consequences faced by the fifteen-year-
old in Gault to a felony proceeding, referring to the threat of 
juvenile detention as “the awesome prospect of incarceration in a 
state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.”23  The 
Court ultimately held that a juvenile commitment proceeding, 
which can result in loss of liberty for a minor, should include all or 
nearly all of those due process protections afforded to the accused 
in criminal proceedings.24  Calling upon the language of an earlier 
opinion, the Court went on to explicitly reject the state’s position 
that proceedings were conducted without due process formality to 
better serve the best interests of the minors: “[T]here is no place in 
our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous 
consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without 
effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.”25 
The lessons of Gault and similar decisions coming in its wake 
are not that parens patriae powers are less broad or invasive than 
in times past, although one could make the argument that the 
 
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.  
Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is 
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the 
“morality and conscience of our society,” no matter how highly motivated 
or impressively constituted.   
Id. at 435. 
 20. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976) (“The court’s 
action . . . is not limited by any narrow bounds, but it is empowered to stretch forth 
its arm in whatever direction its aid and protection may be needed.”). 
 21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 22. Id. at 5–7. 
 23. Id. at 36–37. 
 24. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)) (“We do 
not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the 
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we 
do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”)). 
 25. Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)). 
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impact of the decisions leads to such a result.  The real lesson in 
due process is that it is acceptable for states to interfere and 
subvert the rights of private citizens to protect the welfare of 
vulnerable individuals; just be sure the interference is necessary 
to protect a legitimate state interest and that all procedures are 
followed to the letter. 
The practice of appointing guardians to make decisions on 
behalf of persons incapable of making some or all of their own 
decisions is one of the outgrowths of parens patriae.26  Although 
many guardians, particularly family members, may be unaware of 
the nature of their appointment, guardians are “delegatee[s] of the 
state’s parens patriae power.”27  Thus, in a purely legal sense, a 
mother and father appointed as guardians for medical decisions 
over their adult daughter with an intellectual disability, in 
consenting to or withholding consent for a medical procedure, 
speak not as parents, but as the state.  Whether the parents in 
this hypothetical understand the distinction between the decision 
they made for their seventeen-year-old daughter and the one a 
court order authorized them to make for that same daughter, now 
twenty-one, is less than clear.  While courts are charged with 
oversight of the guardianship arrangements they sanction, 
resources to police this responsibility are scarce or non-existent, 
and the reality is that most guardianships go unmonitored after 
the initial court hearing concludes.28 
Problems with guardianships came into sharp public focus in 
1987, when the Associated Press published an article chronicling a 
study of guardianships in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.29  The authors found that the guardianship system was 
“dangerously burdened and troubled[,]” stripping vulnerable older 
adults “to the rights of a 5-year-old” by creating guardianships 
that “sometimes result[] in financial or physical 
mistreatment . . . .”30  Although the article focused on 
guardianships of the elderly, the findings had system-wide 
implications, and the response was immediate.  New guardianship 
 
 26. Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Third National Guardianship Summit 
Introduction, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012). 
 27. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988). 
 28. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160–62. 
 29. Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing 
System Part I: Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a Troubled System, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sept. 19, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-An-
Ailing-System-Part-I-Declared-Legally-Dead-by-a-Troubled-System/id-
1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f. 
 30. Id. 
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legislation was introduced at the federal and state levels with a 
goal of reforming the system to prevent those abuses the article 
brought to light.31 
In 1988, the American Bar Association’s Commission on the 
Mentally Disabled and Commission on Legal Problems of the 
Elderly, working with national guardianship advocacy 
associations, brought together a group of experts to examine the 
state of guardianship systems and make recommendations for 
reform.32  The Symposium produced thirty-one draft 
recommendations, which were later ratified by the American Bar 
Association.33  The recommendations focused on procedural due 
process, legal representation for the proposed ward, determination 
of incapacity, judicial practices, accountability of guardians, and 
guardianship agencies.34 
Over the ensuing years, many changes to guardianship laws 
were made throughout the country.35  In 1997, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the 
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA) 
and incorporated the previously free-standing Act into the 
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as Article 5.36  This was an effort to 
standardize guardianship law and to separate laws regarding 
incapacitated adults from those regarding minors.  As of the 1997 
amendment, Section 2 of the UGPPA addresses guardianship of 
minors and Sections 3 and 4 address guardianships and 
conservatorships of adults.37  Unfortunately, states have largely 
 
 31. John Parry, Selected Recommendations from the National Guardianship 
Symposium at Wingspread, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 398, 398 
(1988) (stating that the AP report “led to the publication of more than 300 stories in 
various newspapers” and the enactment of guardianship legislation at the federal 
and state levels “aimed at addressing many reporting abuses and deficiencies”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Comm’n on Mentally Disabled & Comm’n on Legal Problems of the Elderly, 
Guardianship, An Agenda for Reform: Recommendations of the National 
Guardianship Symposium and Policy of the American Bar Association, 13 MENTAL 
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 271, 275 (1989) [hereinafter An Agenda for Reform]. 
 34. Id. at 277–305. 
 35. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160 (“The late 1980s and the 1990s 
saw sweeping changes in state laws involving improved due process, a more 
functional determination of capacity not based on labels or age, use of less 
restrictive alternatives, limited orders, and greater guardian accountability.  The 
‘backwater’ topic of guardianship was finally gaining visibility in statehouses 
across the nation.”). 
 36. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 471 
(1997). 
 37. Id. at 509–71. 
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given the UGPPA the cold shoulder; by the end of 2016, it had only 
been adopted in five states and the District of Columbia.38 
In 2001, a second National Guardianship Symposium 
convened.39  This effort produced sixty-eight recommendations 
focusing on developing standards for interstate transfers of 
guardianships, practice guidelines, education, research, funding, 
agency guardianships, monitoring, and accountability.40  Although 
these reform efforts made significant inroads towards improving 
processes and protecting the rights of wards throughout the 
country, troubling issues lingered.41  Some courts blatantly 
disregarded new regulations and best practice guidelines, and 
stories of individuals subject to serious abuses through 
guardianship began to emerge again in the mid-2000s.42  These 
stories prompted changes in several state laws and initiatives on 
the Federal level as well.43  The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws took another stab at 
reform with development of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA), which was 
added to the UPC as Article 5A.44  By the end of 2016, the 
UAGPPJA has been enacted by forty-five states and the District of 
Columbia, making this Act far more successful than the UGPPA.45 
In 2011, a third National Guardianship Symposium 
convened.46  This time, the focus shifted to developing 
recommendations to incorporate person-centered practices into 
guardianship proceedings.47  Indeed, this person-centered focus 
 
 38. The Uniform Law Commission maintains a website that tracks enactment 
of the various uniform acts.  See Legislative Enactment Status: Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings Act (1997), UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings%20Act%20(199
7) (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
 39. A. Frank Johns & Charles P. Sabatino, Wingspan—The Second National 
Guardianship Conference, Introduction, 31 STETSON L. REV. 573, 573–74 (2002). 
 40. Wingspan—The Second National Guardianship Conference, 
Recommendations, 31 STETSON L. REV. 595, 595–609 (2002). 
 41. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1159–60. 
 42. See id. at 1160–61. 
 43. See id. at 1161–62. 
 44. UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION 
ACT, 8A U.L.A. 10 (2007). 
 45. See Legislative Enactment Status: Adult Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Adult%20Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proce
edings%20Jurisdiction%20Act (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
 46. See Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence and 
Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1991, 1991 (2012) [hereinafter Third 
National Guardianship]. 
 47. Leslie P. Francis, Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of 
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pervades the findings and recommendations developed by the 
Symposium.48  It is unclear yet what the impact of these latest 
ambitious reform efforts will be, but it is evident that 
guardianship practice has come a long way since King Edward I of 
England decided to take over the estates of his incapacitated 
subjects.49 
II. The Mechanics of State Guardianship Systems: What the 
Courts Do 
There is no national procedure for appointment of a 
guardian; the practice belongs to the individual states to define.  
Although each state has a vehicle for evaluating capacity and 
transferring decisional rights, there are as many models as there 
are jurisdictions.  This becomes evident when one compares 
guardianship statutes from state to state.  Although there are 
many differences in language and structure, there are some 
elements common to every state.  From start to finish, 
guardianship proceedings have several tasks or steps that must be 
completed, with variations in the order of the second and third 
steps.   
Step 1: Petition 
Guardianship laws throughout the country have liberal 
standing requirements for initial filing of the petition.50  The 
statutes of most states allow any interested person to file a 
petition for guardianship of an adult, which makes it easy to 
initiate the process.  The required contents of petitions have 
become more uniform over the years.  Although some states have 
additional requirements, in general, a petition must contain: the 
name and demographic information of the person alleged to be 
 
Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2012) (“A core theme of the Summit is 
that shaping guardianship practices to center on the person him- or herself—so-
called person-centeredness—is the touchtone of excellence in guardianship.”). 
 48. Third National Guardianship, supra note 46, 1199–1205. 
 49. See Custer, supra note 6, at 195–96. 
 50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-646 (West 2014) (“[a]ny person”); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-10 (2007) (“[a]ny interested person or persons, including the 
proposed ward”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.044 (LexisNexis 2014) (“a proposed 
ward, a governmental agency, a nonprofit corporation or any interested person”); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-2-2 (LexisNexis 2014) (“the individual alleged to be a 
protected person, by a person who is responsible for the individual’s care or 
custody, by the facility providing care to the individual, by the person that the 
individual has nominated as guardian or conservator, by a person acting as a de 
facto guardian or de facto conservator or by any other interested person, including, 
but not limited to, the department of health and human resources”). 
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incapacitated; the nature of his or her disability; the name and 
contact information of the proposed guardian and that person’s 
qualifications; the names and contact information of any family 
members; the specific rights to be transferred if the guardianship 
is granted; the rationale for transferring those rights; and an 
inventory of the property owned by the person alleged to be 
incapacitated.51 
Step 2: Notice 
After the petition is filed, each state has a requirement that 
the petitioner and others receive notice of the petition and that a 
hearing has been scheduled.52  Timing of notice varies and 
different states measure timing in different ways.  Some states 
count the days before the hearing, and require notice to be served 
by as few as five53 to as many as twenty54 days before the hearing.  
The UGPPA requires a fourteen-day notice.55  Some states 
measure the timing of notice from the filing of the petition,56 while 
other states do not require a specific number of days, but instead 
rely on the courts to provide “reasonable” notice.57  Still other 
states do not expressly specify a timing of notice.58  Some statutes 
require that notice be read to the respondent.59  In addition to the 
 
 51. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-5-1 (LexisNexis 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-
303 (West 2013). 
 52. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5309 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 
(West 2014); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-10 (West 2013). 
 53. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-111 (2013). 
 54. E.g., 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (West 2005); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 62-1-401 (2009). 
 55. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 113(a), 8A U.L.A. 
10 (1997). 
 56. E.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4543 (2013) (requiring that notice be 
mailed within three days of the filing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.030 (West 
2006) (requiring that notice be served “not more than five court days after the 
petition has been filed”). 
 57. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3901(c) (2007) (“The Court shall by rule 
provide for reasonable notice to the person with an alleged disability and to such 
others, if any, as the Court may deem desirable; provided that, in all cases where a 
guardian of the person or guardian of the property of an adult with a disability is 
sought, the person with an alleged disability shall be entitled to representation by 
counsel . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075 (2009) (“The notice shall be signed by the 
judge or clerk of the court and . . . served in person on the respondent a reasonable 
time before the date set for the hearing.”). 
 58. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.554 (West 2014). 
 59. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 (West 2016) (“Notice of the filing of a 
petition to determine incapacity and a petition for the appointment of a guardian if 
any and copies of the petitions must be served on and read to the alleged 
incapacitated person.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-17.1 (2011) (“The court officer shall 
present the written notice and shall also read the notice to the respondent.”). 
34 Law & Inequality [Vol. 35:23 
respondent, most states require that other persons receive notice 
of the proceedings.  Several persons or entities may be entitled to 
notice, including spouses, adult children, parents, next of kin, 
heirs-at-law, any person named in the petition, provider of 
residential care (including institutional providers such as nursing 
homes), counsel, guardians ad litem, and interested persons 
designated by the court.60 
Step 3: Counsel 
One of the most significant impacts of recent guardianship 
reform is the availability of counsel to the person alleged to be 
incapacitated in a guardianship proceeding.  Several jurisdictions 
require the appointment of counsel as a matter of right.61  
Appointment is permissive in some states, although the courts are 
usually bound to appoint counsel if requested or necessary.62  
While each state has statutory guidance on the appointment of 
counsel for the respondent, guardians ad litem receive less 
attention.  Those statutes that speak to appointment of a guardian 
ad litem, as with the appointment of counsel, take one of two 
approaches: either to require appointment,63 or leave it to the 
 
 60. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-103 (LexisNexis 2009) (including a spouse, adult 
children, parents, a current guardian or conservator, nearest living adult relative, 
or any other person as directed by the court); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3371 (West 
2016) (including the attorney of the alleged incapacitated person, any guardian 
then serving, next of kin, such other interested persons as the court may direct); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-12 (2007) (including the proposed ward’s legal counsel and 
guardian ad litem (if any), the petitioner and the petitioner’s legal counsel (if any), 
all adult individuals, and other persons who are named in the petition); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:5 (LexisNexis 2007) (including the attorney of the proposed 
ward, relatives whose names and addresses appear on the petition, the proposed 
guardian, the petitioner, or the medical director of a state or private institution, if 
the proposed ward was ever a patient of said institution); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-
17.1 (2011) (including respondent’s spouse, heirs at law, the administrator of any 
care and treatment facility where the respondent resides or receives primary 
services, any individual or entity known or reasonably known to the petitioner to 
be regularly providing protective services to the respondent). 
 61. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:6 (LexisNexis 2007) (describing the 
right to counsel as “absolute and unconditional”). 
 62. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B § 5-106 (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that 
counsel shall be appointed “if the ward, incapacitated person or person to be 
protected or someone on his [or her] behalf requests appointment of counsel; or if 
the court determines at any time in the proceeding that the interests of the ward, 
incapacitated person or person to be protected are or may be inadequately 
represented”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5305 (2014) (stating that counsel shall be 
appointed “[i]f the individual alleged to be incapacitated requests legal counsel or 
the guardian ad litem determines it is in the individual’s best interest to have legal 
counsel”). 
 63. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5305 (West 2012) (setting out the 
duties of the guardian ad litem, whose appointment is required). 
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judge’s discretion.64  Where a guardian ad litem is appointed, some 
states provide statutory guidance for which inquiries should be 
made on behalf of the court, who to consult, and the types of 
expertise the guardian ad litem should possess or seek out in 
another.65 
Step 4: Hearing 
The hearing is the final procedural step in appointment of a 
guardian.  One of the most frightening findings reported in the 
Associated Press article was that forty-nine percent of wards did 
not attend their guardianship hearing.66  Today, almost all 
guardianship laws explicitly recognize the right of a person alleged 
to be incapacitated to be present at his or her hearing.67  Some 
states have a more stringent requirement, mandating that, in the 
absence of defined circumstances, the person attend the hearing or 
that the hearing be brought to the person.68  Many statutes allow 
for respondent’s presence to be waived with a showing of good 
cause.69  For a guardian to be appointed, the majority of states 
 
 64. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B § 5-106 (LexisNexis 2011) (“The court may 
appoint as guardian ad litem, an individual or any public or charitable agency to 
investigate the condition of the ward, incapacitated person or person to be 
protected and make appropriate recommendations to the court.”). 
 65. E.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-10 (West 2007) (“The guardian ad 
litem may consult with a person who by training or experience is qualified to work 
with persons with a developmental disability, persons with mental illness, or 
physically disabled persons, or persons disabled because of mental deterioration, 
depending on the type of disability that is alleged.”). 
 66. Bayles & McCartney, supra note 29. 
 67. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-213 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-650 
(West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-3-106 (2015). 
 68. E.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11 (McKinney 2006) (“The hearing must 
be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be incapacitated, either at the 
courthouse or where the person alleged to be incapacitated resides, so as to permit 
the court to obtain its own impression of the person’s capacity.  If the person 
alleged to be incapacitated physically cannot come or be brought to the courthouse, 
the hearing must be conducted where the person alleged to be incapacitated resides 
unless . . . all the information before the court clearly establishes that (i) the person 
alleged to be incapacitated is completely unable to participate in the hearing or (ii) 
no meaningful participation will result from the person’s presence at the hearing.”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.0535 (LexisNexis 2014) (“A proposed ward who is found 
in this State must attend the hearing for the appointment of a guardian unless: (a) 
A certificate signed by a physician or psychiatrist . . . specifically states the 
condition of the proposed ward, the reasons why the proposed ward is unable to 
appear in court and whether the proposed ward’s attendance at the hearing would 
be detrimental to the physical or mental health of the proposed ward; or (b) A 
certificate signed by any other person the court finds qualified to execute a 
certificate . . . .”). 
 69. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 (West 2016) (stating that presence is 
required “unless waived by the alleged incapacitated person or the person’s 
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require a finding of incapacity by clear and convincing evidence,70 
although New Hampshire expects incapacity to be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt,71 and Wyoming requires only a preponderance 
of evidence.72  Once the burden of proof is met, and it is 
established to the satisfaction of the court that a person lacks 
capacity to make some or all decisions, the judge must determine 
which rights to transfer to the guardian.  The court may order a 
full (plenary) guardianship, transferring all or nearly all of the 
rights of the incapacitated person to the guardian, or take a more 
conservative approach, granting a limited guardianship covering 
only those areas where decisional incapacity is specifically 
proven.73 
Step 5: Monitoring 
One scholarly article about guardianship referred to the 
procedure of adjudicating an incapacitated person and appointing 
a guardian as the “front end” of the process, and the ensuing 
accountability of the guardian and court monitoring as the “back 
end.”74  Ten years later, the same authors wrote that, in spite of 
sweeping changes to the law nationally, the back end has not seen 
the same level of reform as the front end, and although monitoring 
is both required and necessary, resources are largely unavailable 
to facilitate assurance of guardian accountability.75  Some level of 
post-adjudication monitoring of guardianships is required under 
 
attorney or unless good cause can be shown for his or her absence”); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 29-3-5-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that the person alleged to be 
incapacitated must be present unless he or she has “voluntarily waived notice of 
the hearing,” there is evidence the person “voluntarily consented to the 
appointment of a guardian,” it is not “in the person’s best interest to be present 
because of a threat to the health or safety” of the person, or it is “impossible or 
impractical for the alleged incapacitated person to be present”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
59-3063 (2005) (stating that attendance is required “unless the court makes a 
finding prior to the trial that the presence of the proposed ward . . . will be 
injurious to the person’s health or welfare, or that the proposed 
ward’s . . . impairment is such that the person could not meaningfully participate 
in the proceedings, or that the proposed ward . . . has filed with the court a written 
waiver of such person’s right to appear in person”). 
 70. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13-26-113 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-
311 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
29A-5-312 (2004). 
 71. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464A:8 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 72. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-104 (2015). 
 73. Mary J. Quinn & Howard S. Krooks, The Relationship Between the 
Guardian and the Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1611, 1620–33 (2012). 
 74. Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and Now: 
Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 867 (2002). 
 75. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160–61. 
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the laws of every state.76  There is little consistency, however, in 
how this is accomplished.77  In fact, a 2006 study co-sponsored by 
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) found that court oversight 
of guardianships varies widely between jurisdictions.78  Lack of 
funding for monitoring was cited as a problem,79 as was the failure 
to verify the contents of guardians’ filed reports and the failure to 
conduct visits to the wards.80  Around the same time, the ABA 
teamed up with the American Psychological Association to publish 
a guidebook for judges who adjudicate guardianships.81  The 
guidebook outlined several practices for monitoring guardianships 
to guide courts in ensuring this vital function is met, including use 
of volunteer and other non-court resources.82 
III. The Practice of Guardianship: What the Guardians Do 
“To be sure, most guardians are honest and well-
intentioned.”83  As unwieldy as the reformation of the 
guardianship system in this country has proven to be, this is a 
silver lining.  The introduction to the Third National 
Guardianship Symposium’s collected reports describes a 
continuum: “Anecdotal evidence suggests guardianship practice 
can range from quietly heroic, to satisfactory, to unknowingly 
deficient, to malfeasant,” but the authors note that the proportions 
attributable to each category are not known.84  The court order 
granting authority to a guardian is simple: make these decisions 
 
 76. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B § 5-309 (2014) (requiring the 
guardian to file a report sixty days after appointment and annually thereafter, and 
the court to establish a system for monitoring guardianships); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
475.082 (West 2009) (requiring the court to evaluate the status of every person 
under a guardianship annually, also requiring the guardian to file an annual 
report). 
 77. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-655, GUARDIANSHIPS: 
COLLABORATION NEEDED TO PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE 9–12 
(2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04655.pdf (describing broad categories and 
methods of monitoring activities noted throughout the country). 
 78. Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of 
Court Practices 31–35 (AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. et al., eds., 2006). 
 79. Id. at 24. 
 80. Id. at 22. 
 81. See ABA COMM’N ON L. & AGING & AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, JUDICIAL 
DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY OF OLDER ADULTS IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2006), https://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/
judges-diminished.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 56–58. 
 83. See Bayles & McCartney, supra note 29. 
 84. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1162. 
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on behalf of this person under these circumstances.  The reality of 
guardianship in practice, however, is much more complex.  
Experts and advocates for guardianship reform have frequently 
observed the many hats an effective guardian must wear: 
[A] good guardian [must] be knowledgeable about housing and 
long-term care options, community resources, protection and 
preservation of the estate, accounting, medical and 
psychological treatment, public benefits and communication 
with elderly and disabled individuals.  A guardian should 
develop advocacy skills; assume “case management” functions; 
monitor the ward’s living situation; make decisions that are, to 
the greatest extent possible, in accord with the ward’s values; 
avoid any conflict of interest; and regularly report to the 
court.85 
In recognition of the gravity of the role of the guardian and 
the lack of post-adjudication support, all three National 
Guardianship Symposia included training and education for 
guardians as a component of their recommendations.86  Yet, only a 
handful of states require training for non-professional guardians.87 
Perhaps the most important thing a guardian needs to 
understand is the standard upon which to base a decision.  The 
two prevailing standards are substituted judgment and best 
 
 85. Hurme & Wood, supra note 74, at 872 (quoting An Agenda for Reform, 
supra note 33, at 296). 
 86. See An Agenda for Reform, supra note 33, at 296; Wingspan, supra note 40, 
at 602, 605; Third National Guardianship, supra note 48, at 1200. 
 87. See, e.g., ADMIN. ORDER NO. 2012-62 (Ariz. 2012) (“Any person who is 
neither a licensed fiduciary . . . nor a financial institution shall complete the 
training . . . .  The training shall be completed before letters to serve as guardian, 
conservator, or personal representative are issued unless the appointment was 
made . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3145 (West 2016) (setting out curriculum 
requirements and requiring “[e]ach person appointed by the court to be a guardian 
must complete the required number of hours of instruction and education within 4 
months after his or her appointment as guardian. The instruction and education 
must be completed through a course approved by the chief judge of the circuit court 
and taught by a court-approved organization”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39 
(McKinney 2006) (“Each person appointed by the court to be a guardian must 
complete a training program approved by the chief administrator which covers: 1. 
the legal duties and responsibilities of the guardian; 2. the rights of the 
incapacitated person; 3. the available resources to aid the incapacitated person; 4. 
an orientation to medical terminology, particularly that related to the diagnostic 
and assessment procedures used to characterize the extent and reversibility of any 
impairment; 5. the preparation of annual reports, including financial accounting 
for the property and financial resources of the incapacitated person.”); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 11.88.020(3) (West 2006) (“If a guardian or limited guardian is not a 
certified professional guardian or financial institution authorized under this 
section, the guardian or limited guardian shall complete any standardized training 
video or web cast for lay guardians made available by the administrative office of 
the courts and the superior court where the petition is filed unless granted a 
waiver by the court . . . .”). 
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interest.  In order to exercise substituted judgment, the decision-
maker must “attempt to establish, with as much accuracy as 
possible, what healthcare decision an incompetent patient would 
make if he or she were competent to do so.”88  The best interest 
standard, by contrast, is an “attempt[] to weigh the burdens and 
benefits of treatment to the patient in his present condition, when 
no clear preferences of the patient can be determined.”89  While 
substituted judgment asks what the person under a guardianship 
would decide, the best interest standard asks, instead, what a 
reasonable person would decide under the circumstances.90  The 
UGPPA holds guardians to both standards: “A guardian, in 
making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and 
personal values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian.  
A guardian at all times shall act in the ward’s best interest and 
exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.”91  This “dual 
mandate”92 requires guardians to consider what the person under 
a guardianship would decide for him or herself and what would 
protect the person’s best interest.93  The addition of substituted 
judgment to the UGPPA is a positive development, in that it gives 
high priority to the self-determination interest of the ward.94  The 
problem with applying both standards arises when there is discord 
between them, i.e. what the person under a guardianship would 
decide is not in his or her best interest.  Despite the opportunity 
for tension, the UGPPA at least provides a standard. 
As of 2011, only about one-third of American states had 
decision-making standards for guardians incorporated into their 
statutes.95  Of those jurisdictions where a standard is articulated, 
some are states that have adopted UGPPA.96  In the remaining 
states, some articulate a hierarchy, requiring that the guardian 
attempt to apply substituted judgment before resorting to a best 
 
 88. Substituted-Judgment Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed. 
2006). 
 89. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING 
IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 231 (2005), http://hdl.handle.net/10822/559378 (emphasis in 
original). 
 90. Id. at 231, 233. 
 91. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a), 8A U.L.A. 
559 (1997). 
 92. Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted 
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 
45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 741 (2012). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 744. 
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interest decision.97  Other states name both standards, but do not 
provide any guidance on which to use in preference to the other.98 
Interpretation of the correct standard of decision-making is 
often left to the judicial branch.  The cases that inform our 
collective legal knowledge on this subject often involve tragic 
circumstances.  In many cases, the person at the center of the 
controversy dies before the appeal process is complete, even where 
expedited appeals are allowed.99  In those situations where the 
person survives the case, they are often languishing in a 
persistent vegetative state without any hope of recovery.100  That 
we now have this line of cases is due, at least in part, to advances 
in medical science.  In the landmark Quinlan case, one of the 
physicians who examined Ms. Quinlan testified, “[T]hese things 
have occurred all along but the technology has now reached a 
point where you can in fact start to replace anything outside of the 
brain to maintain something that is irreversibly damaged.”101  
Prior to modern advances in medical science, “the physician 
perceived his duty as that of making every conceivable effort to 
prolong life.”102  With the emergence of the ability to stave off 
death in the face of even the gravest diagnosis, a new type of 
question arises: When is the cost of prolonging life too high?  “The 
debate here is . . . not between life and death; it is between quality 
of life and death . . . .”103 
In 1976, in Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court opened 
the door for surrogates to make end-of-life decisions by allowing 
Karen Quinlan’s father to render a decision to terminate life-
sustaining treatment on her behalf.104  Such a decision rests on a 
foundation of the constitutionally-protected right to privacy, 
which, among other things, allows an adult to decide whether to 
 
 97. Id. at 744–45. 
 98. Id. at 746–47. 
 99. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66 n.1 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that 
“Storar died after the case had been argued” in court); Superintendent of 
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Mass. 1977) (stating 
that Saikewicz died due to bronchial pneumonia, a complication of leukemia). 
 100. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 908–09 (Pa. 1996) (describing the attempt of a 
mother/guardian to obtain court approval to remove a feeding tube from her adult 
son who had been in a persistent vegetative state for approximately 16 years); In re 
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–56 (N.J. 1976) (describing a father’s court petition to 
remove life support from his daughter in a persistent vegetative state). 
 101. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 652 n.2. 
 102. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423. 
 103. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. 1988). 
 104. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671–72 (remanding the case to the trial court to 
“appoint Joseph Quinlan as guardian of the person of Karen Quinlan with full 
power to make decisions with regard to the identity of her treating physicians”). 
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refuse or terminate life-sustaining treatment.105  The right to 
privacy remains vested, even in a person no longer able to 
communicate their preferences, but where a surrogate decision-
maker speaks for the patient in a manner that will result in death, 
the state’s interests must also be taken into account.106  To wit, 
according to the Quinlan court, those interests are “the 
preservation and sanctity of human life and defense of the right of 
the physician to administer medical treatment according to his [or 
her] best judgment.”107  The court came down firmly on the side of 
substituted judgment as the guiding standard. 
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if 
Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not 
altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she 
would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible 
condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of 
the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of 
natural death . . . .  We have no hesitancy in deciding, in the 
instant . . . case, that no external compelling interest of the 
State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to 
vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility 
of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life.  We 
perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a 
choice on Karen’s part and a similar choice which, under the 
evidence in this case, could be made by a competent patient 
terminally ill, riddled by cancer and suffering great 
pain . . . .108 
Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme Court 
picked up the Quinlan thread to give guidance on the standard to 
use when considering evidence of a previously-expressed wish to 
forego life-sustaining treatment.109  The case concerned the 
controversy over an end-of-life decision for Nancy Cruzan, who had 
been in a persistent vegetative state since shortly after sustaining 
injuries in an automobile accident seven years earlier.110  Nancy 
was receiving her food and hydration via a feeding tube, and, after 
it became clear that she would not recover, her parents sought to 
have the tube removed and allow her to die.111  The hospital 
required a court order to remove the feeding tube.112  The basis for 
the Cruzans’ assertion that Nancy would not wish to be kept alive 
 
 105. Id. at 662–64. 
 106. Id. at 663. 
 107. Id. at 663. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 110. Id. at 266. 
 111. Id. at 266–67. 
 112. Id. at 268. 
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in her present condition with no hope of recovery was a statement 
she had made to a roommate some time before her incapacitating 
accident.113  At the state court level, this evidence was rejected as 
“unreliable for the purpose of determining [Nancy’s] intent,”114 and 
insufficient to counterbalance Missouri’s “strong policy favoring 
life.”115  The Missouri Supreme Court looked unfavorably upon the 
use of substituted judgment in Nancy’s case: 
As applied in right-to-terminate-treatment decisions, the 
doctrine of substituted judgment is applied in abrogation of 
the state’s parens patriae power, not in furtherance of it.  In 
cases like this one, the doctrine authorizes a guardian to cause 
the death of a ward unilaterally, without interference by the 
state, and contrary to the state’s vital interests in preserving 
life and in assuring the safekeeping of those who cannot care 
for themselves.116 
In deference to the Quinlan decision, Missouri determined 
that a guardian could undertake an end-of-life decision based on 
substituted judgment, but that there must be clear and convincing 
evidence of the incapacitated person’s prior-expressed wishes.117  
The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the lower 
court’s decision to affirm the requirement of clear and convincing 
evidence of an individual’s prior-expressed wishes before allowing 
a surrogate to exercise the right-to-die on his or her behalf.118 
IV. Guardianship of Persons with Intellectual Disability: 
What the Law Says 
As the underlying reason for incapacity, intellectual 
disability is distinct from the disabling condition of an elder adult 
or the minority of a child.  By statute or regulation, each state 
provides a cut-off age by which a person’s intellectual disability 
must be manifest, with the states falling into one of two groups: 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988). 
 115. Id. at 426. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 415. 
 118. The Supreme Court wrote:  
In sum, we conclude that a State may apply a clear and convincing 
evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue 
nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent 
vegetative state. We note that many courts which have adopted some sort 
of substituted judgment procedure in situations like this, whether they 
limit consideration of evidence to the prior expressed wishes of the 
incompetent individual, or whether they allow more general proof of what 
the individual’s decision would have been, require a clear and convincing 
standard of proof for such evidence.  
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284. 
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those calling for identification before the age of eighteen,119 and 
those that allow an additional four years, setting the cut-off age at 
twenty-two.120  Intellectual disability is one of several types of 
developmental disabilities, meaning that the onset of the condition 
occurs during childhood.121  These individuals are, therefore, 
distinct from elderly adults after the onset of a disabling condition 
(who once had capacity) and from non-disabled children (who 
presumably one day will).  Guardianship laws do not always 
recognize a difference. 
A few states have laws that specify separate procedures for 
persons in need of decisional support by reason of an intellectual 
disability.122  The focus of some laws is to simplify the process for 
families and caregivers to arrange for guardians to assist these 
vulnerable adults.123  Procedure is taken away, not added.  Other 
states go to great lengths to include additional protections.124  Still 
 
 119. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.063(9) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-
61(f) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.005(4) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT.  14, 
§ 3061(1)(a) (2010). 
 120. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-1-1(8) (2012); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.21.010 
(2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1205 (2014); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(22) 
(McKinney 2011). 
 121. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 33, 38–39 (5th ed. 2013). 
 122. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-669–684 (2014); IDAHO CODE § 66-404 (2015). 
 123. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-102(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (“The custodial 
parent or parents or an adult custodial sibling of an adult child who is 
incapacitated by reason of an intellectual disability, may file, in lieu of a petition, a 
written request to be appointed guardian of his or her adult child or his or her 
adult sibling in order to continue performing custodial and other parental 
responsibilities or family responsibilities, or both responsibilities, for the child after 
the child has passed his or her minority.  The court may waive any or all 
procedural requirements of the Uniform Guardianship Act, including notice and 
service, and appointments, and interviews.  The adult child alleged to be 
incapacitated shall have had an examination by a physician or other qualified 
person and furnish a written report of the findings to the court.  In lieu of a 
hearing, the probate court shall hold an informal hearing with the custodial parent 
or custodial parents or custodial adult sibling requesting the guardianship, the 
adult child for whom the guardianship is sought, and a guardian ad litem for the 
adult child chosen by the judge of probate.”) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
393.12(1)–(2) (West 2011) (advising, on one hand, that a person with a 
developmental disability is not considered incapacitated solely by reason of the 
individual’s acceptance and receipt of services, but, on the other hand, providing 
that a court can appoint a “guardian advocate,” vested with the same authority as a 
traditional guardian, without first making a finding of incapacity). 
 124. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(d) (West 2016) (“A limited conservator of 
the person or of the estate, or both, may be appointed for a developmentally 
disabled adult.  A limited conservatorship may be utilized only as necessary to 
promote and protect the well-being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage 
the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual, and 
shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s proven mental 
and adaptive limitations.  The conservatee of the limited conservator shall not be 
44 Law & Inequality [Vol. 35:23 
others have laws on the books that seem to conflate the 
intellectual disability with incapacity.125  Often, the laws 
addressing guardianship for persons with intellectual disability 
are found in a separate section of the code from the state’s 
traditional guardianship statutes.126 
Even when a guardian is needed to help with some decisions, 
people who live with intellectual disability do not necessarily lack 
capacity to make all decisions.  For example, In re M.R. was a New 
Jersey Supreme Court case involving a young woman with both 
Down syndrome and an intellectual disability in the mild to 
moderate range.127  The controversy arose when M.R. expressed a 
preference to live with her father, rather than her mother, with 
whom she resided at the time of the case and who was her 
appointed guardian.128  M.R.’s mother refused to allow the move 
 
presumed to be incompetent and shall retain all legal and civil rights except those 
which by court order have been designated as legal disabilities and have been 
specifically granted to the limited conservator.  The intent of the Legislature. . . that 
developmentally disabled citizens of this state receive services resulting in more 
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(emphasis added); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351.5 (West 2016) (expanding California 
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provision or withholding of medical treatment; consent to sexual and social 
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fact, shall define the powers and duties of the partial guardian so as to permit the 
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guardianship proceedings,” which is found in Title 36, Public Health and Safety, 
whereas traditional guardianship statutes are located in Title 14, Trusts, Estates, 
and Protective Proceedings); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1600–1644 (West 
1999) (locating the Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled statute sections 
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Retarded and Developmentally Disabled Persons statute sections in the Surrogate 
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Mental Hygiene Law). 
 127. 638 A.2d 1274, 1276 (N.J. 1994). 
 128. Id. 
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on the grounds that M.R. lacked capacity to make the decision to 
relocate to her father’s house.129  M.R.’s father advocated his 
daughter’s position.130  The court reversed the mother’s 
appointment as guardian and remanded to the lower court to 
make specific findings as to M.R.’s capacity to express a reliable 
preference about where to live.131  In justifying its decision, the 
court drew an important and often-overlooked distinction between 
the type of decision M.R. was attempting to make and other, more 
permanent decisions: 
We are reminded also that the mere fact that a person is 
generally incompetent does not mean that person is 
incompetent for all purposes . . . .  A person who is generally 
incompetent can still make choices about specific matters.  
Depending on the facts of the case, someone who is unable to 
manage his or her own affairs may still be capable of deciding 
where and with whom to live . . . .  A second distinction . . . 
concerns the seriousness of the incompetent’s decision.  The 
decision where to live, if proved incorrect, can be corrected 
more easily than can the decision to be sterilized.  We 
recognize the argument that as a decision increases in 
importance, so should the right of the affected person to make 
that decision . . . .  Our goal is to permit developmentally-
disabled people to make as many decisions as possible, while 
protecting them from the harmful effects of bad decisions that 
they do not fully understand.132 
The lesson from In re M.R. seems to be that the level of 
specific competence needed to make a decision increases with the 
gravity and irreversibility of that decision.133  It is, therefore, not 
unexpected that the area where the judicial branch most 
frequently steps in is health care decisions.  Although there is not 
a lot of reported case law involving health care decisions for 
persons with intellectual disability, two examples illustrate the 
unique difficulties faced by courts in evaluating how surrogate 
decisions should be made for these individuals. 
In the first case, a Massachusetts man named Joseph 
Saikewicz lived all but the first twenty of his sixty-seven years at 
Belchertown State School, an institution for the care of individuals 
with intellectual disability.134  His life was impacted by an 
intellectual impairment that was classified in the profound 
 
 129. Id. at 1276. 
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 131. Id. at 1282. 
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 134. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 
420 (Mass. 1977). 
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range.135  In 1976, Joseph was diagnosed with incurable leukemia; 
even with treatment, he had only months to live.136  Joseph could 
not communicate his own wishes, and, as he had no involved 
family willing to serve as his legal decision-maker, the 
administrator of the school sought the guidance from the court.137  
A guardian ad litem was appointed, and made the 
recommendation not to treat Joseph, on the grounds that Joseph 
would not be able to understand the treatment, which, if 
administered, would lead to fear, pain, and little extension of 
life.138  The probate court judge issued an order agreeing with the 
recommendation of the guardian ad litem, but asked the higher 
court to review the decision.139  The Superior Court issued an 
order affirming the probate decision, and Joseph died about eight 
weeks after the order without receiving chemotherapy, but in 
relative comfort.140  Several months later, the court issued a 
written opinion explaining its decision, thereby providing the first 
guidance we have about medical decisions for people with 
intellectual disability. 
As a threshold matter, the Saikewicz court noted that 
persons who lack capacity have the same substantive right to 
decline medical treatment as everyone else.141  The court found 
that the most appropriate way to approach a surrogate decision is 
to attempt, as nearly as possible, to determine the ward’s actual 
interests and preferences, and be guided by those.142  In short, the 
court advocated a substituted judgment standard, but stopped 
short of developing guidelines for guardians making healthcare 
decisions.143 
Four years later, the New York Court of Appeals reached the 
opposite conclusion in In re Storar.144  This opinion was the 
consolidation of two cases.  The first concerned Joseph Fox, a 
member of a Catholic religious order, who, at the age of eighty-
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 136. Id. at 420–21. 
 137. Id. at 419. 
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 139. Id. at n.2. 
 140. Id. at 419–22. 
 141. Id. at 423. 
 142. Id. at 431. 
 143. Id. at 432 n.18 (“We decline the invitation of several of the amicus and 
party briefs to formulate a comprehensive set of guidelines applicable generally to 
emergency medical situations involving incompetent persons.  Such a wide-ranging 
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 144. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981). 
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three, suffered cardiac arrest during an operation.145  In order to 
be kept alive, Brother Fox was kept on a respirator, but the lack of 
oxygen to his brain left him in a persistent vegetative state.146  
The director of his order petitioned the court to honor Brother 
Fox’s prior-expressed wish not to be kept alive by such 
measures.147 
By contrast, fifty-two-year-old John Storar had lived almost 
all of his life in an institution due to his intellectual disability and 
accompanying deficits, described to be in the profound range.148  
Around the same time as Brother Fox’s surgery, John was 
diagnosed with bladder cancer.149  His mother was appointed his 
guardian and approved radiation treatment for the cancer, which 
subsequently went into remission.150  The cancer returned the 
following year and was then determined to be terminal.151  As a 
result of the cancer, John developed internal bleeding and 
required transfusions.152  His mother initially consented but 
withdrew her consent because John was apprehensive about the 
transfusions and resisted them.153  It was uncontroverted among 
the experts that John’s bladder cancer would result in his death 
within a few months, and that not receiving the transfusions 
would hasten his death.154 
The court took the opportunity to juxtapose these cases and 
draw a distinction between surrogate end-of-life decision-making 
on behalf of a person who once had capacity to make his own 
decisions and a person who never had such capacity.155  There was 
no difficulty in disposing of Brother Fox’s case; there was sufficient 
evidence of his previous comments—repeated two months prior to 
his final hospitalization—to support a finding that he would not 
want to remain alive under the circumstances.156  The court 
passed over the constitutional privacy right that the Quinlan court 
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rested upon, saying rather that Brother Fox had a common law 
right to refuse treatment.157 
In the second case, the court noted that John never had 
capacity to make his own decisions: “Thus it is unrealistic to 
attempt to determine whether he would want to continue 
potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent.”158  For 
this court, the important distinction was that the blood 
transfusions could successfully treat the loss of blood indefinitely, 
and without excessive pain.159  The court looked at the blood loss 
in isolation from the cancer. With the transfusions, John was 
essentially as he was before; without them, he became weak, 
listless, and faced an earlier death.160  Citing law regarding health 
care decisions for children, the court found that the benefits of the 
blood transfusions to John outweighed the burdens, and the 
treatment was thus in his best interest.161 
There is some consensus that, while self-determination and 
preservation of autonomy point to use of a substituted judgment 
standard for many decisions, for health care decisions, the better 
standard is best interest.162  One author notes: 
Although people with [intellectual disability] are capable of 
gaining (or losing) skills over time, the level of an individual’s 
underlying intellectual impairment does not change 
appreciably.  As a result, it will seldom be possible to refer to 
an individual’s preferences as expressed during a previous 
period of greater decisional capacity.163 
The definition of the term “substituted judgment doctrine” 
includes this qualifier: “Generally, the doctrine is used for a 
person who was once competent, but no longer is.”164  It would 
seem, then, that substituted judgment should rarely be used as 
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the only standard for making health care decisions for an adult 
with intellectual disability. 
V. Guardianship of Persons with Intellectual Disability: 
Practical Problems 
There are some troubling facts surrounding health care 
outcomes for people whose lives are impacted by an intellectual 
disability.  A growing number of studies substantiate claims that 
health disparities exist across several measures for people with 
intellectual disability as compared with the general population.165  
Absent a physician’s recommendation to the contrary, people with 
intellectual disability should receive screening tests (e.g., 
cardiovascular screening, cancer screening) at least as often as 
members of the general population.166  Although these individuals 
have about the same rates of cancer as the general population,167 
they receive routine cancer screenings far less frequently, or not at 
all, and are more likely to die of cancer.168  A 1999 study found 
that breast cancer deaths among individuals with cerebral palsy, a 
condition often co-occurring with intellectual disability,169 were 
three times higher than in the general population.170  The authors 
of the study hypothesized that this was at least in part due to 
failure of timely diagnosis and treatment in this group.171 
 
 165. See Havercamp et al., supra note 4, at 420–25. 
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 170. David Strauss et al., Causes of Excess Mortality in Cerebral Palsy, 41 DEV. 
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 580, 584 (1999) (stating that, for individuals with 
cerebral palsy, “death from breast cancer is three times more likely than in a group 
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 171. Id. (stating that “[i]n a population with development disability and frequent 
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How does this implicate guardians?  In the real world, 
guardians of persons with intellectual disability are a subset of 
decisional support available to adults with diminished capacity.172  
Because an individual under a guardianship is, in effect, “reduced 
to the status of a child in the eyes of the law[,]”173 most advocates 
agree that guardianship should be the last port of call.174  
Guardians, thus, are part of a larger group of supporters who 
assist adults with intellectual disabilities in making decisions, in 
ways that are recognized formally at law (e.g., powers of attorney, 
representative payees) and in ways that are not (e.g., family 
support of a legally-competent adult who needs help with some 
decisions).  There is a growing body of research that tends to 
indicate that some of these supported decisions are different from 
the decisions the average person would make for him or herself, 
particularly in the area of healthcare.  Consider the following 
examples. 
In one study, sixteen mothers and sisters of women with 
intellectual disability submitted to interviews exploring their 
perspectives on mammography for their loved one.175  Although 
family members reported that they valued quality health care for 
their daughter or sister, they hesitated to schedule mammograms, 
citing worries that a cancer screening and diagnosis would lead to 
unnecessary suffering.176  Those interviewed also reported worries 
about the inability of their loved one to understand the rationale 
for cancer treatment, and one sister reported, “We’re not as 
aggressive as we would be if it was me, or my husband.”177  
Several participants, however, also reported stories where they 
were surprised by their loved one’s resilience.178  In particular, one 
mother, who dreaded taking her daughter for her first 
mammogram, reported, “[W]e got up to the plate, and this very 
nice young woman came out, and [my daughter] said ‘okay you can 
wait here.’  And she went with the woman and she did a great job.  
She did a really, really good job.”179  A second study, conducted in 
 
difficulty in communication, delay in diagnosis of cancer may be common”). 
 172. Horstman, supra note 18, at 217. 
 173. Id. at 231. 
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2010, asked nurses who provide services to persons with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities about the barriers to 
cancer screenings for these patients.180  Twenty-six percent of 
study participants reported that they had experienced instances 
where a screening was ordered, but the family refused.181 
It is not just the attitudes of family members providing 
support that can lead to poor decisions.  Even in these times, 
people with intellectual disabilities face “discriminatory social 
attitudes,” and this experience sometimes extends to the doctor’s 
office.182  Among the answers provided by the nurses in the study 
described above were several that point to a need for greater 
education in the health care community about patients with 
intellectual disabilities.183  As a result, sometimes the reason for 
lower numbers of screening and treatment is that a physician or 
nurse advised the family against the procedure, and a decision 
consistent with that medical advice was made.184  The need for 
additional education among health care providers has been 
repeatedly recognized.185  As long as there are health care 
providers who make different recommendations for persons with 
intellectual disability than for their other patients, those providing 
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decisional support stand in a position of pivotal importance as 
health care advocates. 
The attitude of the person in need of decisional support can 
also be a problem.  Many adults with intellectual disability do not 
consider themselves disabled and regard any indicia of disability 
as stigmatizing.186  These individuals will often go to great lengths 
to defend their autonomy and avoid seeking clarification of things 
they don’t understand.  As a result, they can often appear to have 
greater decisional capacity than they actually possess.187  Latent 
limitations of understanding present very serious risks where 
decisional supporters rely exclusively upon the stated preferences 
of the person with an intellectual disability.  As a baseline 
example of how this can be a problem, research suggests that 
significant numbers of adults with intellectual disability have an 
incomplete understanding of death.188  Thus, an expressed 
preference of an individual with an intellectual disability to forego 
life-saving treatment must, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, be considered in light of a probable imperfect 
understanding of the finality of the consequence of that decision.  
On the contrary, an evident joy of life in a person with an 
intellectual disability can be viewed as evidence that the 
individual, to be quite blunt, does not want to be dead.189 
VI. Striking a Balance Between Advocacy and Protection 
It is important to point out that the discussion that follows is 
based upon a presumption of a guardian appropriately appointed 
to make decisions on behalf of a person who has been 
demonstrated to lack capacity to make those decisions for him or 
herself.  This is not always the case.  Guardianship appointments 
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that are unnecessary and overbroad are the subject of substantial 
literature, and calls for reform are ongoing.190  In fact, there is a 
strong argument that an undue guardianship of an individual 
with intellectual disability constitutes a civil rights violation.191  
The comments below are restricted to guardianships that are 
necessary and appropriate. 
One of the lessons that comes from the foregoing analysis is 
that there is often tension between maximizing individual self-
determination and making decisions promoting the best interest of 
the individual with an intellectual disability.  This is further 
complicated by the vast range in functional ability that lies 
between those with the mildest intellectual disability and those 
with the most severe.192  The very label of intellectual disability 
evokes stigma and can obscure the reality that this diverse cohort 
of our population has rich potential, talent, and ability that 
benefits society.  Balancing the rules of advocate and protector can 
be incredibly frustrating, even for those with a strong grasp of the 
distinction between the two.  The history of guardianship in the 
United States is a vivid illustration of a strong inclination toward 
protectiveness, often at the expense of advocacy. 
Although the tenets of person-centeredness promote shifting 
focus to the person’s strength and away from the disability, a 
diagnosis can be instructive, particularly for attorneys and judges 
with limited experience in this area.  It is reasonable to presume 
that there is almost always some specific competence in a person 
diagnosed with an intellectual disability, particularly with those 
falling in the mild to moderate range.  Even a person whose 
communication is so compromised that he or she cannot express 
the most basic choice has some way of showing preference.  For 
instance, a person may not be able to provide informed consent to 
take a medication he or she has never taken. But, after some 
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experience, he or she may be able to provide feedback on whether 
the medication is effective or what side effects he or she 
experiences, and make an informed choice among available 
alternatives.  Similarly, while an individual may not be able to 
competently choose whether or not to go to a medical specialist, he 
or she might be able to choose which doctor among those available 
he or she would prefer to see. 
As the court advised in In re M.R., the amount of decisional 
support needed increases with the gravity and irreversibility of 
the decision.193  For example, the same person who is competent to 
choose where and with whom to live may not be able to make an 
informed decision to consent to or forego a medical procedure.  The 
problem is that there is no single test for specific competency.  
Because there are many variables that impact decision-making, it 
really is a distinct set of skills from person to person that can 
change over time.  The level of intellectual disability is a guidepost 
for judges and guardians ad litem.  Where the individual has a 
mild or moderate impairment, it is likely prudent to find out what 
types of decisions he or she can make independently or with 
informal support.194  Where appropriate, specific types of decisions 
can even be reserved to the individual in the guardianship order. 
A final point is this: although a guardian is appointed in a 
protective capacity, some guardians have little or inaccurate 
understanding of what that means.  Recall the stories of 
caregivers who avoided medical screenings because of their 
concerns about their loved one’s ability to withstand the 
procedure, or their own fears of what would happen in the face of a 
diagnosis.  These are often family members who believe that they 
are protecting their loved one and advocating for his or her best 
interest.  In reality, this is neither protection nor advocacy and can 
lead directly to adverse results, even death. 
When a recommendation for routine medical screening 
challenges a guardian’s belief about what is best for the ward, or 
what the ward can withstand, the guardian, without further 
support or direction, may make a decision that violates his or her 
protective mandate.  This can happen while the guardian believes, 
in all sincerity, that he or she is acting in the best interest of his or 
her family member.  Front-end guidance from the court, either 
directly or through mandatory training, can be powerful in 
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combating this type of well-intentioned mischief.  The rule of 
thumb is simple: absent guidance from a doctor to the contrary, a 
person with an intellectual disability should receive the same 
wellness care, screenings, and treatments as would a member of 
the general population with the same resources.  This is the very 
protection for which a guardian is appointed.  Making that 
expectation clear in a courtroom setting may be, by itself, the 
single most powerful protection that can be given. 
 
